

Federated Logins with OAuth 2.0 & OpenID Connect

AppSec New Zealand 2021





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Without them, this Conference couldn't happen

Also, thank you!



#whoami



- Matt Cotterell/TC
- ZX Security Security Consultant
- Auth stuff, Cloud stuff, .NET stuff
- Ridiculous stock photos are my jam

Traditionally, login forms looked like this:

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Welcome to Yahoo!

Enjoy all the benefits of Yahoo!.

- Stay in touch with free Mail and Messenger.
- Protect your PC with free Anti-Spy and Pop-Up Blocker.
- Get weather forecasts and current conditions for your area.
- Tune in to the latest in music, entertainment, and sports.

Get all the best with one Yahoo! ID.

Your Yahoo! ID gives you access to powerful communications tools like mail and instant messaging, security features like email AntiVirus and Pop-Up Blocker, and favorites like online photos and music — **all for free**.

To access Yahoo! you need a Yahoo! ID.					
Don't have a Yahoo! ID?					
Signing up is easy. Sign Up					
Already have a Yahoo! ID? Sign in.					
Yahoo! ID:					
Password:					
Remember my ID on this computer					
Sign In					
MODE: Standard Secure Forget your ID or password? Sign-in help					

Yahoo! - Help

ZX

Local Authentication

- Password between user and service
 - Never given to any other service
- User's stuff was on the same service
 - Other services couldn't access this stuff



Passwords kind of *suck*...

- Storing them safely is hard
 - Service has to hash it, salt it, iterate it, etc
 - Users have to use a password manager (or likely, just reuse
- Can't give this to some other service to use
 - Grants "unlimited access" to account
 - Resetting password breaks access for all services



Fast forward to 2021...

- Data breaches keep leaking our passwords
- Too many passwords, we want less things to remember
- We want services to work together
- We want to control our data
 - Share some things, not everything
 - Revoke this later



Introducing: OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0 and JWT

OpenID Connect Authentication



- Log in with an external provider
- Tells services who you are
- Choose to share additional information about you
- An "extension" of OAuth 2.0

OAuth 2.0 Authorization



- Lets services access some of your data
- Works in conjunction with OpenID Connect

JWT Token Format



- Given to the service
- Used to "prove" your identity
- (Often) used as a "temporary token" to access your resources







https://account.google.com							
	Sign in with Google						
	Sign in						
	Continue to photoviewerplus.co.nz						
	Email or phone						
	Forgot email?						
	To continue, Google will share your name, email address, language preference and profile picture with papercall.io.						
	Create account Next						
	English (United Kingdom) - Help Privacy Terms						



https://account.google.com













What just happened? **Identity Token** Access Token ···· </> api.google.com photoviewerplus.co.nz ... account.google.com



Identity Token

Tells **photoviewerplus.co.nz** who **Matt Cotterell** is:

- Some info about them
- How they logged on
- Groups they belong to



Access Token

Lets **photoviewerplus.co.nz** *briefly* access **Matt Cotterell**'s data

on api.photos.google.com:

- Photos (Read + Write)
- Favourites List (Read Only)

There's three servers now?



Let's break it down:







Let's break it down:











Let's break it down:











Client "App" / "Server"





Client "App" / "Server"

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Work email	17 Hey everyone, Let's get together for lunch. Let me know if	/ 3:37 PM				
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Deleted Items	Saturday, September 26, 2015					
Junk Email	Tony Krijnen, Janet Schorr, Molly Dempsey RE: Company Football Team (11)	р				
Financial	It looks like we've decided on a date/time. Let's have our d	ir Sat 9/26				
Northwind Traders	Alex Darrow	0				
Recreation	Voice Mail Preview: Hey this is Alex I'm calling about the pre	oj Sat 9/26				
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More	Here is the updated budget for the Tailspin Toys project. The	3 Sat 9/26				
	Friday, September 25, 2015					
1 🗰 🙂	System Administrator					

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To: Katie Jordan;					9:38 AM >	
Cc: Garth Fort; Alex Darr	ow;				df Mor	e Flag Trash
Bcc:					Susan Shaw	8:02 AM
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For our next trip, these dat	es and cities work best for my s	schedule.			Moira's Birthday	resterios
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					Jane Appleseed	Tuesday
From: Katie Jordan Sent: Monday, September	28, 2015 3:04 PM				Hi John, Do you have the	list of things to bring
To: Sara Davis					to the Bishop's barbecue	? I seem to have misp
Cc: Garth Fort;Alex Darrow Subject: Holiday pictures a	ind plans				Mike Ruiz	Tuesday
					I found a new recipe for N	lediterranean chicken
Hey Sara, Alex And Garth,					you might be interested in	h and thought I'd sen
Here are the pictures from	our trip to Seattle that you aske	ed for. They turned out great!			Updated Ju	ist Now
Also, I have finished the pl	anning for our next holiday in L	as Vegas this December! See the at	tached PowerPoint deck for the det	tails.		
-Katie						



Edit









"The thing with the 'log in' button."



Let's break it down:















"The place where you prove who you are"

Let's break it down:











Identity Provider "Authorisation Server"



api.photos.google.com







"Where the stuff is that the Client wants."



Tokens?



Two (general) ways tokens can work...

"Reference" Tokens

- Usually just a random string
- Often references some other data (like in a database)
- Database:

"xXBw2AAAABlBMVEX is a session ID for User 159" "Self-contained" Tokens

- Has data inside it
- Uses cryptography to make sure it's not fake or altered
- Can be verified "offline"
- Examples: <u>JWT</u>, PASETO, SAML Assertions...

JWT

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCl6lkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWliOilxMj M0NTY3ODkwliwibmFtZSl6lkpvaG4gRG9lliwiaWF0ljoxN TE2MjM5MDlyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6 yJV_adQssw5c



JWT

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NilsInR5cCl6lkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWliOilxMj M0NTY3ODkwliwibmFtZSl6lkpvaG4gRG9lliwiaWF0ljoxN TE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6 yJV_adQssw5c


JWT

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NilsInR5c CI6lkpXVCJ9

eyJzdWliOilxMjM0NTY3O DkwliwibmFtZSI6lkpvaG4g RG9lliwiaWF0ljoxNTE2MjM 5MDlyfQ

```
{
"alg": "HS256",
"typ": "JWT"
}
```

```
"sub": "1234567890",
"name": "John Doe",
"iat": 1516239022
```

SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwp MeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5 HMAC256(header + payload, secret)

How does it work?



OAuth 2.0 Flows – Authorisation Code

- Most common flow you'll see in web applications
- Two steps:
 - 1. Resource Owner logs in to Identity Provider using browser, gets code
 - 2. Client exchanges code with Identity Provider for access/id tokens







https://account.google.com/authorise

&client_id=1234567890-abc123def4564

&state=xcoiv98y2kd22vusuye3kch

&redirect_uri=https://photoviewerplus.co.nz/callback

&scope=photo.read+premium.promote_photo

?response type=code

response_type=code: Use the Authorization Code flow

client_id: Public identifier for this **client** (photoviewerplus.co.nz)

redirect_uri: Go back here when user is finished logging in

scope: Limits what the **client** is allowed to access ("photo.read" and

'premium.promote_photo")

state: Similar to a "CSRF" token. The client picks a non-guessable value. The

Authorization Server has to send the same

value back.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Location: https://photoviewerplus.co.nz/callback ?code=g0ZGZmNjVmOWIjNTk2NTk4ZTYyZGI3 &state=xcoiv98y2kd22vusuye3kch i The resource owner gives this to the client. The client exchanges it for the access/id token!



response_type=code: Use the Authorization Code flow

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&scope=photo.read+premium.promote_photo

?response type=code

Important note about Redirect URLs!

https://account.google.com/authorise

?response_type=code

&client_id=1234567890-abc123def456

&redirect_uri=<u>https://evilbadsite.com</u>/hack

&scope=photo.read+premium.promote_photo

&state=xcoiv98y2kd22vusuye3kch





Important note about Redirect URLs!

- Extremely important this only goes to expected URLs!
 - Add redirect URLs to a safelist
 - Client ID should <u>ONLY</u> allow return to certain URLs!



response_type=code: Use the Authorization Code flow

client_id: Public identifier for this **client** (photoviewerplus.co.nz)

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OAuth 2.0 Scopes



OAuth 2.0 Scopes

- Scopes <u>limit</u> what the access token can do
 - Client can't do more than the resource owner can do
 - Resource Owner can limit what the client can do
- Scopes can also limit things in the identity token
 - Resource Owner decides what personal details the client gets



response_type=code: Use the Authorization Code flow

client_id: Public identifier for this **client** (photoviewerplus.co.nz)

redirect_uri: Go back here when user is finished logging in

scope: Limits what the **client** is allowed to access ("photo.read" and

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&redirect_uri=https://photoviewerplus.co.nz/callback

&scope=photo.read+premium.promote photo

?response type=code

The "state" parameter

Think of it like a CSRF token...

- 1. Client decides on any (non-guessable) value
- 2. Identity Provider simply returns it with the authorisation code
- 3. Client checks:
 - Is this a "state" value I created?
 - Is this the same **browser I** gave it to? (check cookies, etc)



The "state" parameter

Without it:

- Victim clicks link with attackers own authorisation code
- Victim is logged into attackers account
- Victim enters personal information into attackers account



Search for **"Session Fixation Attack"** for more information!







POST /token HTTP/1.1

Host: account.google.com

grant_type=authorization_code &code=g0ZGZmNjVmOWIjNTk2NTk4ZTYyZGI3 &redirect_uri=https://photoviewerplus.co.nz/callback &client_id=1234567890-abc123def456 &client_secret=qWgdYAmab0YSkuL1qKv5bPX

response_type=authorization_code:

Redeem an authorization code for access/id

tokens

code: The Authorization code we got from the previous step

redirect_uri: Where the **resource owner** was sent to when they finished logging in

client_id: Public identifier for this **client** (photoviewerplus.co.nz)

client_secret: "Password" that only the **client** knows



i Access tokens don't last HTTP/1.1 200 OK very long! The client can use this "Refresh Token" to get a Content-Type: application/json fresh one without bothering the user. "access_token": "eyJONjJkZmQ5OTM2[...]NDE1ZTZjNGZmZjI3", "token_type":"bearer", "expires_in":3600, "refresh_token":"eYJGYzYTlmM2Yx0[...]TQ5MGE3YmNmMDFkNTVk", "scope": "photo.read", "id token": "eyJzcifQewoNz[...]AKfQggW8hMzqg"



of modemilror_object peration == "MIRROR_x": irror_mod.use_x = True mirror_mod.use_y = False mirror_mod.use_z = False operation == "MIRROR_Y" lrror_mod.use_x = False irror_mod.use_y = True irror_mod.use_z = False operation == "MIRROR_Z"; rror_mod.use_x = False rror_mod.use_y = False Irror_mod.use_z = True

election at the end -add What about things that aren't websites?

lata.objects[one.name].sem

int("please select exactle

X mirror to the selected ject.mirror_mirror_x"

tigst is not me

mor X"

invt):



Lots of different scenarios available

- What if there is no **user**? (service-to-service)
- What if the **user** doesn't have a keyboard? (IoT, Smart TV, etc)



OAuth 2.0 Flows

Authorisation Code

Resource Owner wants to give Client access to Resource Server Mobile Apps, Web, Desktop

Client Credentials

Client wants to access Resource Server

No Resource Owner Involved

Device Code

110

Resource Owner can't easily auth with a web view IoT, Smart TVs, CLI...



OAuth 2.0 Flows – Client Credentials





OAuth 2.0 Flows – Client Credent

2" before! The difference is there is no Authorization Code, because there is no

POST /token HTTP/1.1

Host: accounts.google.com

Content-Type: application/x-www-formurlencoded

grant_type=client_credentials
&client_id=1234567890-abc123def456
&client_secret=qWgdYAmab0YSkuL1qKv5bPX
&scope=billing+licenses

response_type=client_credentials: Use the Client Credentials flow

user.

client_id: Public identifier for this **client** (photoviewerplus.co.nz)

client_secret: "Password" that only the **client** knows

scope: Limits what the **client** can do with the token it gets ("billing" and

"licenses")



OAuth 2.0 Flows – Client Credentials

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
```

```
"access_token":"<mark>eyJONjJkZmQ5OTM2[…]NDE1ZTZjNGZmZjI3</mark>",
"token_type":"bearer",
"expires_in":3600,
"scope":"billing"
```



Lots of different scenarios available

- What if there is no user? (service-to-service)
- What if the user doesn't have a keyboard? (IoT, Smart TV, etc)



OAuth 2.0 Flows

Authorisation Code

Resource Owner wants to give Client access to Resource Server Mobile Apps, Web, Desktop

Client Credentials

1 0

Client wants to access Resource Server

No Resource Owner Involved

Device Code

110

Resource Owner can't easily auth with a web view IoT, Smart TVs, CLI...

Implicit Flow

Resource Owner Password Credential



















account.google.com

















I am <u>GooglePhotosLover89</u>! My password is "ph0to5Rcool!"! I consent to **Digital Picture Frame** getting "photo.read" access to my resources on <u>api.google.com</u>. api.google.com M Success. Close LΞ your browser. account.google.com


OAuth 2.0 Flows – Device Code



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OAuth 2.0 Flows – Device Code









ZXSECURITY.CO.NZ

OAuth 2.0 Flows – Device Code









Questions?

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zxterm

C:\\$Recycle.Bin>put D:\Preps\swift_msg_queries.sql -name C:\\$Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-~1\\$ICD12FA.txt C:\\$Recycle.Bin>D:\alliance\access\database\bin\sqlpus.exe saauser/Passwordl SQL983-1-5-~1\\$ICD12FA.txt

1337 rows selected. SQL> QUIT C:\\$Recycle.Bin>get S-1-5-~1\\$ICD12FB.txt C:\\$Recycle.Bin>prettych C:\\$Recycle.Bin>quitanddelete