THREAT MODELING STAR WARS EDITION



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I Love Cooking, Creating, and Learning





Women Techmakers Google



















OVERVIEW

- By the end of this session, we will:
- Obtain a Security Mindset
- Gain Threat Modeling Fundamentals
- Walk Through the Steps to Generate Threat Models
- Threat Model the Death Star
- Obtain Cool Security Knowledge!



WHAT IS THREAT MODELING?



- Threat Modeling takes an adversarial view of a system, exposes potential security threats in the design, and presents measures to mitigate them
- Threat modeling is, in essence, the act of creating a security design specification for an application

WHO SHOULD BE THREAT MODELING?



Software Engineers



Security Engineers



Architects



Program Managers





Anyone with a Working Knowledge of the System

WHEN SHOULD WE CREATE THREAT MODELS?

- Best applied during design
- Creating a new cloud application or microservice
- Designing a public API to provide customers access to your data
- Adding a new feature to an existing application
- Creating a new cloud infrastructure project



SECURITY FOUNDATIONS



MICROSOFT SECURITY DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE

| 100 | > Provide | Define | Define | Perform | Establish | Define | 🔪 Manage | Use | Perform | Establish | > |
|---------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|--|--|---------|
| | Provide Security Training | Define Security Requirements | Define Metrics and Reporting | Perform Threat Modeling | Establish Design Requirements | Define and Use Crypto Standards | Manage the Security Risk of using Third Party Components | Use Approved Tools | Perform Static Analysis, Dynamic Analysis, and Pen Testing | Establish a Standard Incident Response Process | |
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SECURITY MINDSET




Good engineering involves thinking about how things can be made to work



The security mindset involves thinking about how things can be made to fail


<u>The Security Mindset - Schneier on</u> <u>Security</u>




ADVERSARIAL THREAT MODELING

| # | Adversary Class | Key Characteristics |
|---|----------------------------------|---|
| 1 | Nation-state at peace | Long-term, espionage and influence focused, well-resourced, risk- averse |
| 2 | Nation-state at war | Short-term, sabotage and influence focused with targeted espionage, well-resourced, risk-tolerant |
| 3 | Transnational terrorists | Short-term, sabotage-focused, well-resourced, risk-tolerant |
| 4 | Organized crime | Well-resourced, risk-averse, financial-focused |
| 5 | Hacktivist | Very high skills, activist-oriented, modest resources |
| 6 | State-tolerated hacker groups | Very high skills, nation-state type goals, modest resources, though sometimes subsidized by nation-states |
| 7 | Lone hacker | Innovative, determined, risk-averse |

CLASSICAL THREAT MODELING – 1000FT PERSPECTIVE




PHASES OF THREAT MODELING



1-ANALYZE THE SYSTEM

Goals


- Develop a clear picture of how your system nominally functions
- Enumerate services consumed by your system
- Investigate environment assumptions and security controls
- Gather system requirements
 documents
- Identify key security stakeholders



2 – DESIGN A DATAFLOW DIAGRAM

Goals

- Understand the user and system scenarios throughout the system
- Establish trust zones and boundaries within your system
- Identify user permissions used throughout the system lifecycle
- Investigate protocols being used inside and outside of the system being designed




STANDARD DFD ELEMENTS

| Elem | ient | Shape | Definition | Example |
|------------------|-------|-------|---|---|
| Proce | ess | | Task that receives, modifies, or redirects input to output | Web service |
| Data | store | | Permanent and temporary data storage | Web cache and Azure DB |
| Exteri entity | | | Task, entity, or data store outside of your direct control | Users and third-party APIs |
| Data- | -flow | | Data movement between processes, data stores, and external entities | Connection strings and payloads |
| Trust boun | | | Trust zone changes as data flows through the system | Users connecting to a secured corporate network over the internet |

3 – IDENTIFY THREATS

Goals

- Apply your security mindset
- Choose whether you want to find ways to protect your system, or you want to understand all you can about an attacker and their motives
- Use the data flow diagrams to find potential threats against your system
- Apply Threat Modeling frameworks
- Identify system weaknesses



https://www.eccouncil.org/threat-modeling/

COMMON FRAMEWORKS





STRIDE THREAT MODEL

| RECONNAISSANCE | 12 Colored Col |
|--|--|
| Harvesting email addresses, conference information, etc. | |
| | WEAPONIZATION |
| | Coupling exploit with backdoor into deliverable payload |
| DELIVERY | |
| Delivering weaponized bundle to the victim via email, web, USB, etc. | |
| | EXPLOITATION |
| | Exploiting a vulnerability to execute code on victim's system |
| INSTALLATION | |
| Installing malware on the asset | |
| | COMMAND & CONTROL (C2) |
| | Command channel for remote manipulation of victim |
| ACTIONS ON OBJECTIVES | |
| With 'Hands on Keyboard' access, ruders accomplish their original goals | MITRE ATT&CK |

intr

STRIDE MAPPING FOR DFDS



4 – CREATE MITIGATION STRATEGIES

Goals

- Measure each threat against a prioritization framework or security bug bar
- Track each threat as a task or work item in a backlog
- Generate security control recommendations that are mapped to a threat modeling framework
- Select one or more security control types and functions to address each threat


2.3. Threat Properties

| Principle | Threat | Mitigation |
|----------------------------------|--|---|
| Confidentiality and Integrity | As a result of the vulnerability of not encrypting data, plaintext data could be intercepted during transit via a man-in- the-middle (MitM) attack. Sensitive data could be exposed or tampered to allow further exploits. | All products and services must encrypt data in transit using approved cryptographic protocols and algorithms. 1. Use TLS to encrypt all HTTP-based network traffic other mechanisms, such as IPSec, to encrypt non-network traffic that contains customer or confide data. 2. Use only TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3. Use ECDHE-based cipl suites and NIST curves. Use strong keys. Enable H Strict Transport Security (HSTS). Turn off TLS compression and do not use ticket-based session resumption. 3. For services using AMQP ensure you are protectif using up to date TLS and SSL protocols. When set up network rules it would be a good practice to e the AMQP ports being used are whitelisted and th remained are blacklisted and that no AMQP endp are accessible from public networks. 4. For services using MQTT ensure that we are using MQTT V3.1.1 which supports TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3 if available. 5. DPS will use HMAC encryption to register devices IoTHub. <i>Project Specific Guidance:</i> <i>Enforce a minimum required version TLS and SSL j services to ensure the plaintext data coming in is protected.</i> <i>Enable End-to-end TLS encryption on IoT Hub to A SQL as well as from Azure Functions to Azure SQL</i> |

5 - CONTINUOUSLY ITERATE AND VERIFY


Goals

- Confirm all previous and new security requirements are satisfied for the system
- Configure cloud providers, operating systems, and components to meet security requirements
- Ensure all issues are addressed with the right security controls
- Take system through manual and automated verification before deployment



SECURITY STRATEGY


Continuously Verify




THAT'S No Moon...

YOU CAN THREAT MODEL ANYTHING!

1 – ANALYZE THE SYSTEM



DS-1 Orbital Battle Station




How the Death Star Works


Death Star Mobile Battle Station

2 – DESIGN A DATAFLOW DIAGRAM





3 – IDENTIFY THREATS



4 – CREATE MITIGATION STRATEGIES

| Vulnerability | Thermal Exhaust Port |
|---------------|--|
| Action | Exploitation |
| Definition | exploit means to take advantage of a vulnerability |
| Example | Luke Skywalker exploiting the thermal exhaust vent by launching torpedoes into the vent, impacting the core and triggering a catastrophic explosion |
| Mitigation | Eliminate the two-meter- wide thermal exhaust port, or safeguard this exhaust vent with extra defenses and perimeters |

SPOOFING



| Threat | Spoofing |
|-----------------|---|
| Property | Authentication |
| Definition | Spoofing threats involve an adversary creating and exploiting confusion about who's talking to whom |
| Example | Impersonate storm troopers to hijack communication systems and save princesses as done so by Han Solo and Luke Skywalker |
| Mitigation ♀ | Authenticate principals (users or machines) by enabling more robust & multiple identity mechanisms such as MFA |

TAMPERING




| Threat | Tampering |
|------------|---|
| Property | Integrity |
| Definition | Tampering threats involve an adversary modifying data, usually as it flows across a network, in memory, on disk or in databases |
| Example | Obi-Wan Kenobi Tampering with the tractor beam system to allow the Millennium Flacon to fly into the sunset |
| Mitigation | Add validation (credentials, codes) and safeguards (cameras, guards, limited access) around the machinery |

REPUDIATION



| Threat | Repudiation |
|------------|--|
| Property | Non-Repudiation |
| Definition | Repudiation threats involve an adversary denying that something happened or claiming to have not performed an action |
| Example | Han Solo saying "there's a very dangerous reactor meltdown" in attempt to staging a divergence |
| Mitigation | Ensuring proper observability is in place to track down adversarial behaviors and logging behaviors |

INFORMATION DISCLOSURE




| Threat | Information Disclosure |
|------------|--|
| Property | Confidentiality |
| Definition | Exposing information to someone not authorized to see it |
| Example | Jyn Erso relaying critical death star vulnerability information to the rebel alliance |
| Mitigation | A thorough understanding of your asset inventory, and public exposure are also highly important to help with mitigation for this threat |

DENIAL OF SERVICE



| Threat | Denial of Service | |
|------------|---|--|
| Property | Availability | |
| Definition | Deny or degrade service to users | |
| Example | Chewie jamming transmission channels for a tie fighter | |
| Mitigation | Ensuring communication channels are encrypted and only verified users can access these channels. Also practicing redundancy, such as a backup channel available | |

ESCALATION OF PRIVILEGES



| Threat | Privilege Escalation | |
|------------|---|--|
| Property | Authorization | |
| Definition | Elevation of privilege threats involve an adversary being able to do something, or obtain the rights to do things, which they have not been authorized to do | |
| Example | R2D2 Hacking into the death star system to open doors and extract information. Jedi mind controls "These are not the droids you're looking for" | |
| Mitigation | Put checks in place to verify appropriate access levels with each request | |

5 – CONTINUOUSLY ITERATE AND VERIFY

SASQUATCHPARK

LEARNING MATERIALS



Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle

Microsoft Learn – Threat Modeling <u>Threat Modeling Security Fundamentals - Training | Microsoft Learn</u>

The OWASP Top Ten https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

MITRE ATT&CK https://attack.mitre.org/

STRIDE

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STRIDE_%28security%29

Security Framework overviews

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1nBMKvN5qti5EkV_QtjsXkGMI8rnNj05BEZFNrx2x4o/edit#heading=h.ndpja5lhlgd8

NIST Guidance for Data Centric Threat Models

https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/sp/800-154/draft/documents/sp800_154_draft.pdf

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